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ZONING-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PLANNING AND ZONING
DECISIONS IN KENTUCKY
I. IMODUCrION
One of the most serious and difficult problems in land planning
today is the extent of control courts exercise over the decisions of
"planners" by way of judicial review. It is the purpose of this note to
examine what the Kentucky courts review in fact, as well as what de-
cisions they ought to review. For the most part, discretionary phases of
administrative functions which are subject to review by trial de novo
will be considered; however, other types of review, including that
which is exercised over the legislative phase of planning and zoning as
evidenced by municipal ordinances, will also be discussed.'
A. Statutory Outline
There are three primary categories, based on city classifications,
into which Kentucky planning and zoning statutes are divided. Sub-
sequent reference to Category 1, Category 2, or Category 3, will re-
late to the appropriate classification as follows:
(1) Category 1-Provisions pertaining to cities of the first class
and counties containing such cities. 2
(a) Agencies
KRS section 100.032 authorizes first class cities and counties
in which they are located to create a joint city-county planning and
zoning commission, 3 and a joint board of zoning adjustment and
appeals.4 Authority to enact zoning regulations is reserved to the city
legislative body and county fiscal court.5
(b) Judicial Review
A unique provision contained in the statutes permits an appeal
to the circuit court for de novo "review" of any action or decision by
1 For a general discussion of judicial control and review of proceedings for
variances and exceptions to zoning regulations, see Annot., 168 A.L.R. 13, 130-56(1947).
2 Ky. Rev. Stat. (hereinafter referred to as KRS) §§ 100.031-.098 (1959).
3 The commission's duties include the preparation and amendment of a com-
prehensive plan. See KRS § 100.044-.049, .052-.056, .058, .066, .078 (159). The
commission also has extensive power over subdivision control. See KRS H8 100.088-
.094 (1959). The commission may be given authority to consider and dispose of
various matters pertaining to designated construction projects. See KRS 88
100.059-.062, .065 (1959). Furthermore, it may appoint a zoning enforcement of-
ficer to administer zoning regulations and restrictions, and to issue zoning per-
mits and certificates of occupancy. KRS § 100.074 (1959).
4 The board may hear, decide, and enforce cases taken on appeal from the
action or decisions of a zoning enforcement officer. KRS H8 100.076, .082 (1),
.082 (4) (1959). The board may also grant variances and exceptions to zoning
regulations, in addition to interpreting zoning maps and making decisions on
special zoning questions. See KRS § 100.082 (2)-(3) (1959).
5 KRS § 100.067 (1959).
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the commission with respect to approval of adjustments to the master
plan.6 Any action or decision of the commission in approving or disap-
proving certain construction projects may also be reviewed de novo. 7
Adjustments to the original zoning plan are subject to the same pro-
cedure as adjustments to the master plan,8 and commission decisions
with respect to approval of subdivision plats are similarly subject to a
de novo review. Likewise, an appeal from any decision, ruling, or
order by the board of adjustment and appeal may also be reviewed
upon a de novo hearing.'0
(2) Category 2-Provisions pertaining to cities of the second class
and counties containing such cities."
(a) Agencies
Second class cities and counties in which they are located may
establish a planning commission,12 composed of city and county repre-
sentatives, for the city and county area.13 Thereafter, provision must
be made for a board of adjustment 14 to hear and decide various ap-
peals and applications for variances and special exceptions. 15
6KRS § 100.057 (1959). The language of this section could be more pre-
cise. Although it seems to expressly authorize appeals from any decision or action
of the commission, the section heading is captioned, "Appeal to courts from de-
cision of commission on question of approving adjustments." In context, "adjust-
ments" seem to refer to adjustments in the master plan, since that plan is dis-
cussed in the five sections preceding KRS § 100.057.
In the absence of delegation to the commission, the city le gslative body
and/or county fiscal court must approve or disapprove proposes adjustments.
KRS § 100.052 (1959). There is no indication as to how approval must be made,
or whether it may be reviewed upon a trial de novo.
7 KRS H3 100.059, .063-.065 (1959). These sections raise a problem similar to
that in note 6 supra. In the absence of delegation to the commission, the city
legislative body or county fiscal court must give approval by appropriate order,
resolution or proposal. There is no provision for a review by trial de novo. In
this connection, see note 58 infra and accompanying text.
8 KRS § 100.066 (1959).
9 KRS § 100.089 (1959).1o KRS § 100.085 (1959).
11 KRS H3 100.320-.490 (1959).
12 The commission may prepare, make, or approve a comprehensive plan,
various aesthetic recommendations, and a zoning plan with supplementary regula-
tions and restrictions. KRS H3 100.350-.851 (1959). The commission exercieses
control over the adoption of a master plan, and over approval of construction
work, subdivision plats, and dedications of land, as well as reservations of land
for future acquisition. See KRS H3 100.853-.354, .360-.364 (1959). The commis-
sion is also charged with the responsibility of making certain reports to be acted
upon by the appropriate legislators. See KRS H3 100.390-.410 (1959). Similarly,
the commission must approve changes to established plans before they are adopted
by the legislators, KRS § 100.420 (1959). With respect to requests for approval
of subdivision plats, a planning commission in Category 1 or 3 must act thereon
with a specified period of time. KRS § 100.088, .750 (1959). Category 2 has no
similar provision.
13 KRS H3 100.320,.330(1) (1959).
14 KRS § 100.430 (1959).
15 KRS H3 100.450-.470 (1959). A variance from the terms of an ordinance is
authorized where a literal enforcement of its provisions would result in unneces-
sary hardship. Variances are generally of two kinds: use variance and height,
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(b) Judicial Review
The scope of judicial review in this category is, oddly, more
limited than in first class cities. A final order by the board of adjust-
ment may be appealed by petition to the circuit court for a review
limited to a determination of whether the board acted ultra vires,
whether its decision was procured deceitfully, or whether it was
rendered in accordance with various zoning requirements.' General-
ly, the review is limited to a hearing based on the record certified by
the board, and no new evidence may, as a rule, be introduced.' 7 There
is no provision for review of the commission's activities.
(3) Category 3-Provisions pertaining to cities of the third, fourth,
fifth and sixth classes, and counties containing such cities.'8
(a) Agencies
In promulgating zoning ordinances and regulations, cities of the
third through sixth classes must create an advisory zoning commis-
sion,19 and may create a board of adjustment" and a planning com-
mission .2 1
(b) Judicial Review
Apart from appeals to contest awards of compensation which
are made upon the reservation of land for street locations, 22 the only
provision for judicial review in this category relates to petitions for a
writ of certiorari directed to the circuit court for review of a decision
by the board of adjustment.23 The circuit court, upon granting the
writ, is not limited to a review upon the record certified by the board,
but may take additional evidence.24 There is no provision to review
activities of either the planning or zoning commission.
bulk and area variance. The first permits a use otherwise prohibited in a district,
whereas the latter merely permits a more intensive use of land. An exception in a
zoning ordinance is one allowable where facts and conditions detailed in the
ordinance are found to exist. Horack & Nelan, Land Use Controls 176 (1955).
16KRS §§ 100.480-.490 (1959).
1 KRS § 100.490 (1) (1959).18KRS §§ 100.500-.880 (1959).
19 KRS § 100.550 (1959). The zoning commission is empowered to hold hear-
ings and make various recommendations or reports.2o KRS § 100.560 (1959). The board may grant variances or special excep-
tions, and hear appeals from decisions of zoning officers. See KRS §§ 100.570,
.580 (1959).
21 KRS § 100.610 (1959). The planning commission has authority to make and
adopt a master plan, approve various types of construction work, promote public
relations, control subdivision development, and recommend that land be reserved
for future acquisition and use as public streets. See KRS §§ 100.650, .670-.690,
.720-.750, .790 (1959). Once a planning commission is created, the powers and
records of any existing zoning commission are merged therein. KRS § 100.710
(1959).22 KRS § 100.820 (1959).
23 KRS § 100.590 (1959).24KRS § 100.590 (4) (1959).
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B. General Background
As the foregoing statutory outline would tend to indicate, any
examination of Kentucky's planning and zoning laws must consider
numerous variable factors before cases and comments therein take on
meaningful perspective. By way of summary, the more apparent
factors include:
(1) The enabling act: Authority for municipal, or municipal-
county, exercise of planning and zoning functions is delegated by KRS
Chapter 100. Inasmuch as the Kentucky planning and zoning laws
were revamped in 1942,25 the outcome of a case may depend on the
particular enabling act in force at the time.
(2) City classification: The pre-1942 planning and zoning statutes
applied only to cities of the first and second class. Now, however, the
statutes apply to cities of the third through sixth class as well, and
matters of substance, procedure, discretion, and review may depend
upon the classification of a particular city involved.
(3) Planning authority involved: When discussing the extent of
control which courts do or should exercise over "planners," that term
may encompass at least three broad and distinct groups: viz., the
appropriate legislative body which may enact ordinances or promul-
gate orders and resolutions; the planning and/or zoning commission;
and the board of adjustments. The outcome of a case may well depend
upon which agency or body is having its decisions reviewed.
The necessity of distinguishing the various groups was pointed up
in Stout v. Jenkins,26 where the facts stated in the opinion indicated
that a zoning commission had granted a variance from the statutory
scheme. However, this function is reserved to a board of adjustment.
Although at one point the opinion indicated that a board granted the
variance, subsequent language left this statement open to doubt. If
the court used "board" and "commission" interchangeably, it com-
mitted an error since these are distinct agencies which have separate
functions and powers.
(4) Type of action originally brought: The disposition of a plan-
ning and zoning case on appeal may depend on the nature of the
suit from which the appeal arose. In referring to "nature of the suit,"
consideration must be given to such matters as whether the action was
25 Formerly, planning and zoning statutes were applicable only to first and
second class cities. Carroll's Ky. Stat. Anno. (Baldwin's 1936 Rev.) §§ 3037h-111
through -137; §§ 8235f-1 through -13. These provisions were repealed by Ky.
Act 1942, ch. 176, at 709. This repealer also gave form to the present planning
and zoning laws. Compare Ky. Acts 1942, ch. 176, at 709-52, with KRS ch.
100 (9.w.26 268 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1954).
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instituted to declare an ordinance invalid, to enjoin enforcement of
an ordinance,,or to set aside the determination of a board or commis-
sion.
(5) Type of matter being reviewed: Particularly with respect to
reviewing the grant of a variance, a court's attitude may depend on the
type of variance sought. Although the statutes give unqualified author-
ity to grant variances, the Kentucky court has prohibited the grant of a
"use" variance.2 7
(6) Interpretation of statutory review provisions: Kentucky
authorizes three types of judicial review, each of which is separate
and distinct from the others. Among these, provision is made for
review by a trial de novo, and by a writ of certiorari. The actual scope
of review under each provision may depend on the interpretation
given to their respective meanings.
II. Ti-i SPECMuM OF JUDICIAL REvmw
Between the extremes of complete preclusion of review and com-
plete substitution of judicial judgment on all questions lie various "de-
grees" of judicial review. Professor Kenneth Davis' recent four volume
work on administrative law2 8 furnishes a point of departure to scan
generally this spectrum of review.
The "substantial evidence" test, which is used in conjunction with
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) section 10,29 is sub-
stantially the same as the scope of review of jury verdicts.3 0 In apply-
ing this test, the court decides questions of law but limits itself to a
test of reasonableness in reviewing findings of fact.31 This may be dis-
tinguished from the broader power of review afforded by the "clearly
erroneous" test under which the findings of a judge without a jury may
be reviewed judicially.32 One of the apparent purposes of the APA was
to insure that courts would not sustain findings when there was a mere
scintilla of evidence to support them, no matter how lacking in proba-
tive force.33
With respect to a review of inferences drawn by administrative
agencies, the theory of the federal law is that the reviewing court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, unless the court
'
2 7 Arrow Transp. Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of the City of Paducah,
299 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1956). See also note 15 supra.28 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958).
29 60 Stat. 324 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
30 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 29.02, at 120-21 (1958).
31 Id. § 29.01, at 114.
32 Id. § 29.02, at 121.
33 Id. § 29.06, at 147-48.
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chooses to treat the inference as a question of law and thereby remove
it from administrative discretion.34
The aforementioned substantial evidence test rests on a law-fact
distinction. To obviate this distinction and determine the feasibility
of substituting judicial judgment, some courts may apply a "rational
basis" test. Where substitution of judicial judgment is deemed inap-
propriate, a court may declare that the administrative action must be
upheld if it has warrant in the record, and a rational basis in law.3 5
However, when a court sets a determination aside on the asserted
ground that it is without a rational basis, the court itself may be unsure
as to whether it has substituted its judgment.36
Another formula is the "no basis in fact" test which has been used
primarily in military draft cases. In the application of this test, courts
may not weigh evidence to determine whether a finding was justified;
an administrative determination must be sustained unless there is no
basis in fact for it. Thus, something less than substantial evidence
would sustain a finding.37 Conversely, a trial or hearing de novo
furnishes a broader review than that afforded by the substantial evi-
dence test. In some de novo proceedings, a court may take its own
evidence and use independent judgment on questions of law, fact,
policy and discretion;3 8 i.e., the court may substitute its judgment.
Between the substantial evidence test and the complete substitution of
judgment, a test may be applied to determine whether a finding is
against the "manifest weight of evidence."3 9
Judicial review may be made on the administrative record, or on
a new record before the reviewing court. But once an administrative
record is made, courts are reluctant to take testimony from the same
witnesses, even when a statute expressly provides for a de novo re-
view.40 In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court
may consider the record in either of two respects. It may look at the
evidence on both sides, (i.e., look at the whole record) and consider
whatever detracts from the evidence it holds to be substantial. Other-
wise, the court may look only at evidence on one side and appraise its
substantiality when standing alone.41
A statute may be unconstitutional in providing too much review.
Under article III of the federal constitution, a court may not hold a
3 Id. § 29.05, at 141.
35 Id. § 30.05.
36 Id. § 80.18, at 264.
37 Id. § 29.07, at 150; and see § 29.04, at 135.
38 Id. § 29.07, at 152.
39 Id. at 153.
40 Id. § 29.08, at 152-53.
41 Id. § 29.03.
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trial de novo to review non-judicial administrative actions. However,
questions of law are still appropriate for judicial decision, and the
doctrine becomes effective only if the court must exercise a legislative
or administrative discretion.42 The problem may be evaded by inter-
preting a statute which expressly provides for de novo review to mean
that only a more limited review may be had. Although a court may
still determine whether an agency acted ultra vires, based its decision
on substantial evidence, or conducted itself arbitrarily, it may not
substitute its discretion for that of the agency.
43
In summary, there are at least six tests, standards or scopes of
judicial review, viz., "substantial evidence"; "clearly erroneous"; "ra-
tional basis"; "no basis in fact"; "manifest weight of evidence"; and
trial de novo.
III. Tim TmAL DE Novo IN KENTUCKY PLANNING
AND ZoNING APPEALS
As previously mentioned, the Kentucky General Assembly revised
the state's planning and zoning laws during its 1942 session. However,
until the newly authorized system was placed in operation, first class
cities retained their former power to enact zoning ordinances. Thus,
where it appeared that the joint Louisville and Jefferson County plan-
ning and zoning commission had not been placed in operation by 1954,
the authority of Louisville (a first class city) to enact ordinances dur-
ing that year was upheld.44
By comparison, Willoughby v. Tafel45 indicated that the 1942 pro-
visions for judicial review were effective immediately. In the Wil-
loughby case, a variance had been granted soon after KRS Chapter
100 was enacted. An appeal to the circuit court was thereafter dis-
missed. The Court of Appeals held that it was not improper to dismiss
the case, notwithstanding the statutory provision for trial de novo. In
a strict sense, it was agreed that the circuit court should have rendered
an independent judgment upon a de novo review. But since an inde-
pendent judgment of the circuit court would have supported a grant
of the variance anyhow, the Kentucky Court of Appeals declined to
reverse the case on that point. Dismissal of the appeal by the circuit
court was a harmless error.
42'Id. § 29.10, at 180-82.
43 Id. at 184-86.
44 See City of Louisville v. Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., 286 S.W.2d 546 (Ky. 1955).
Upon judicial review, the particular ordinance in controversy was deemed valid
since it bore a reasonably substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety
and general welfare. This test of validity was distinguished from the trial de
novo which was provided to review the action of administrative zoning authori-
ties. Id. at 548.
45 300 Ky. 792, 190 S.W.2d 475 (1945).
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Although the new review provisions were effective immediately,
their scope remained in doubt for many years; succeeding cases failed
to resolve this doubt until 1954. For example, where the statutes
authorized a trial de novo, a circuit court could still dispose of a case
upon demurrer when facts in a statement of appeal would not, even
if proved, entitle the appellant to relief.46 Likewise, where the circuit
court gave a de novo hearing, but based its decision on a commission's
determination rather than an independent judgment, the Court of
Appeals could nevertheless consider the case on appeal without re-
mand.47 Similarly, dictum in Hill v. Kesselring48 seemed to advance
the unarticulated proposition that the the requirement of a trial de
novo may be satisfied without a trial where statements or counsel dis-
close no cause of action or defense, or where they admit facts which
preclude recovery by their client. In this case, a circuit court decis-
ion based on statements of counsel was reversed, not because a de
novo hearing was denied, but because no evidence had been taken on
a particular question which was put in issue.
More recently, the decision of Louisville & Jefferson County Plan-
ning & Zoning Comm'n v. Cope49 involved consideration of a trial de
novo in its fuller aspects. In this case, the appellee sought to have an
unimproved twenty acre tract of land rezoned from "residential" to
"commercial" so that it could be used for a shopping center. After
an apparently uncontested hearing on the rezoning application, the
appellant-commission rejected appellee's request. An appeal was then
taken to the circuit court where, in a trial de novo, the judge made
independent findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court de-
cided that appellants evidence was insufficient to justify a denial of
appellee's "right" to rezoning, and that the proposed reclassification
would have no adverse effect on the health, safety, morals or welfare
of the community. The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's determination. It was held that the circuit court acts as an in-
dependent fact-finding body whose determinations will be reversed
only if clearly erroneous.
The Cope case made no reference to cases such as Schloemer v. City
of Louisville,50 or Fried v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning &
46 Thomson v. Tafel, 309 Ky. 753, 218 S.W.2d 977 (1949).
47 Hamilton Co. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
287 S.W.2d 434 (Ky. 1955). Although this case was decided after 1954, it illu-
strates how problems under the "de novo provisions" have been presented to the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, and how the court has avoided direct consideration
of what a de novo hearing embodies.
48 310 Ky. 483, 220 S.W.2d 858 (1949).
49 318 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1958).
50 298 Ky. 286, 182 S.W.2d 782 (1944).
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Zoning Comm'n,51 both of which were admittedly different on their
facts and circumstances. While neither case involved a trial de novo,
their underlying judicial philosophy or attitude toward planning and
zoning decisions bears observation. In Schloemer, appellants unsuc-
cessfully sought to obtain permission from the planning and zoning
commission, as well as the board of adjustment, to establish a business
in an area zoned residential by a municipal ordinance. In sustaining a
denial of this permit, the Kentucky court declared that if reasonable
minds should differ as to whether the restrictions have a substantial re-
lation to public health, morals and welfare, the ordinance must stand.
In the Fried case, there was a dispute as to the placement of a line
separating commercial and residential property. In upholding a de-
termination by the planning and zoning commission, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals stated that placement of the line was a decision for
the commission to make, and if it was based on reason and logic, the
court would not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authori-
ties.
Unfortunately, the philosophy underlying Schloemer and Fried had
been rejected in Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning
Cbmm'n v. Grady,52 a forerunner of the Cope case. In Grady, an ap-
plication for rezoning was denied, primarily because it would not
conform with a comprehensive plan adopted by the commission. Upon
a de novo review, the circuit court directed the commission to grant
appellee's requested application. The Kentucky Court of Appeals sus-
tained the circuit court; the ratio decidendi was that a hearing de
novo meant trying the case anew, as though no decision had been ren-
dered previously. Therefore, the substantial evidence rule was in-
applicable, and the circuit court had to determine whether the evi-
dence it heard preponderated (i.e., "tipped the scales") against the
commission's decision. The Fried case was summarily overruled inso-
far as it was deemed inconsistent with Grady, and the Schloemer case
was distinguished on the ground that it involved a direct attack on the
zoning ordinance. However, this distinction is untenable.
Although a zoning ordinance may be attacked as unreasonable,53
the Schloemer case merely involved a request for exemption from the
rigid application of a particular ordinance; the ordinance itself was not
under attack. The Schloemer case did not, as Grady would have us
believe, involve the review of a legislative decision. This fact was
recognized by the late Judge Sims, dissenting in Arrow Transp. Co. v.
Planning and Zoning Comm'n.54
51 258 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953). 52 273 S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1954).
53 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
54 299 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Ky. 1956).
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Noms
When reduced to their fundamental elements, both Schloemer
and Fried involved judicial review of decisions by a local administra-
tive agency; however, neither case involved review by a trial de novo.
The Grady and Cope cases also involved judicial review of decisions
by a local administrative agency; but in addition, they involved re-
view by de novo proceedings. Since the only real distinguishing
characteristic between each pair of cases is the type of review, it ap-
pears that the judiciary's attitude toward planners' discretion depends
solely upon whether the planners' decision is subject to a de novo re-
view. Not only is this arbitrary distinction unjustified, but the Grady
and Cope decisions will also tend to render local comprehensive
plans virtually nugatory upon a mere tipping of the evidential scales
against the planners' considered opinion.
The above contrast in judicial attitude is further illustrated by a
case coming within Category 3. Richlawn, Kentucky (a sixth class
city), was zoned entirely residential; however, appellee prevailed
upon the circuit court to rezone certain property for commercial pur-
poses. The court found that rezoning would cause no danger to the
public health, safety, morals or welfare, and that the city had acted
arbitrarily in denying the petition for rezoning. This holding was
reversed in City of flichlawn v. MeMakin.55 In essence, the Kentucky
court declared that the question is not whether rezoning would create
a hazard to public health, morals, safety or welfare, but whether the
existing ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a valid exercise of
the police power.
These foregoing cases lead to the tentative conclusion that the
Kentucky Court of Appeals will uphold any reasonable planning and
zoning ordinance, regulation, or decision, in the absence of a de novo
review by the circuit court. This analysis is buttressed by a 1988 de-
cision which involved a first class city.56 Before the Kentucky statutes
authorized de novo review in Category 1, the grant of a variance was a
matter of discretion which would not be disturbed in the absence of
arbitrary and unreasonable action; furthermore, the existence of proper
evidence before the board, and its acquaintance with the local situa-
tion and needs, could be presumed.
Since a trial de novo is available only in Category 1, it is evident
that inequities may result under the existing statutes. The deter-
mination of a commission or board may be upheld as "reasonable"
when reviewed within the framework of Category 2 or 8, but an iden-
tical determination may be set aside when reviewed under a Category
55 313 Ky. 265, 230 S.W.2d 902 (1950).
56 Selligman v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 277 Ky. 551, 559-60, 126 S.W.2d
419, 424 (1938).
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1 trial de novo, notwithstanding the fact that it is manifestly reason-
able. Why should an applicant's chance of avoiding established policy
depend on the appellate review he secures? Perhaps uniformity could
be obtained in all situations by providing a trial de novo in each of the
three categories. But it is submitted that the trial de novo should be
eliminated from the planning and zoning field.
Two additional cases merit consideration at this point. One, Sellig-
man v. Von Allmen Bros., Inc.,57 was decided in 1944-two years after
the de novo provisions became operative. The board of adjustment
denied an application for a variance, and the circuit court reversed this
determination; the reported case did not indicate whether a trial de
novo was provided. The Kentucky court reversed the circuit court
and declared that the power to grant a variance rested in the board's
discretion; the board's decisions should not be disturbed unless unrea-
sonable and arbitrary. Does this mean that there is still an opportunity
for the Kentucky court to reverse an independent determination by a
circuit court, and reinstate the board's determination when it is no
more than "reasonable"?
In considering the second case, it must be realized that under cer-
tain circumstances the functions of a city or county legislative body
may be delegated to a planning commission. Thereafter, the commis-
sion's actions may be reviewed by a trial de novo. However, if the
delegation is not made, an identical action by the local legislature
cannot be reviewed in a de novo proceeding. Thus, where the fiscal
court of a county containing a first class city effectuated a master plan
by approving some construction work, when authority to grant such
approval could have been delegated to the commission, there was no
right of appeal to review the fiscal court's action. Although such an
appeal would have been afforded if the legislative body had acted in-
directly through the commission, the right to appeal is not inherent,
and in the absence of governing constitutional provisions, it may be
granted or withheld by the state General Assembly."
GENERAL RAMW=CATION OF A TmAL DE Novo
A majority of jurisdictions do not allow a trial de novo, and a
planning or zoning (administrative) decision will ordinarily be
deemed "finar'. However, a court may still review errors of law, de-
termine whether there has been an abuse of discretion, or ascertain
57 297 Ky. 121, 179 S.W.2d 207 (1944).58 East Jeffersontown Improvement Ass'n v. Louisville & Jefferson County
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 285 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1953). Cf. note 95 infra and
accompanying text.
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whether the decision was arbitrary or oppressive.59 On the legislative
side, zoning ordinances are ordinarily upheld if they are reasonable,
or if there is a fairly debatable question of reasonableness. 60
In Massachusetts, those aggrieved by the decision of a board of
appeals may secure a hearing de novo; the judge may make his own
findings of fact, independent of the board, and determine the validity
of the board's decision.61 In reviewing the decision de novo, the judge
may not adopt the board's determination as he might adopt the report
of some judicial officer. The board's findings are no more than the report
of an administrative body, and have no evidentiary weight on appeal. 62
Once the court makes its findings of fact, it applies the law to the facts
found. But when, for example, there is no legal compulsion to grant a
variance, its issuance is a matter of discretion. So even with a trial de
novo, the court may not invade the field of administrative discretion.6 3
Elsewhere, hearings de novo have been accorded a similar, if not
identical, interpretation. For example, Oklahoma subscribes to the
view that such a hearing permits the court to make such judgment or
order as the board of adjustment or appeal should have made.64 And
as previously indicated, Kentucky has committed herself to the view
that a hearing de novo permits independent judicial fact-finding fol-
lowed by a decision based upon a preponderance of evidence; such a
decision will be upheld unless clearly erroneous.65
But just as "judicial review" has many meanings, so too does the
concept of trial de novo. Even when provision is made for a trial de
novo, its meaning, scope, and effect may be eminently uncertain.
In Missouri, a case may be tried de novo so that the reviewing court
can determine whether a board's order is illegal, arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable; the court may not try the case de novo in order to
substitute its discretion for that of the board. 66 Sometimes, a de novo
hearing will be made on the record, and from that the reviewing court
r5 2 Rathkopf, Zoning & Planning 204-11 (3d ed. 1957); 1 Yokley, Zoning
Law & Practice § 177 (1953).60 Rhyne, Municipal Law 830 (1957). Or, as Mr. Justice Smith aptly stated,
"[T]his Court does not sit as a super-zomng commission." Robinson v. City of
Bloomfield Hills, 305 Mich. 425, 86 N.W.2d 166, 169 (1957).61 Marotta v. Bd. of Appeals, 336 Mass. 199, 143 N.E.2d 270, 272 (1957);
Bicknell Realty Co. v. Bd. of Appeal, 330 Mass. 676, 116 N.E.2d 570, 57-973
(1953).62 Devine v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 332 Mass. 319, 125 N.E.2d 131, 133
(1954).
63Pendergast v. Bd. of Appeals, 331 Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 916, 918-19
(1954).
64 City of Tulsa v. Fred Jones Co., 203 Okla. 321, 220 P.2d 245, 248 (1950).
65 See notes 49 & 52, supra and accompanying text.
66 Veal v. Leimkuehler, 249 S.W.2d 491, 495-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); accord,
Berard v. Bd. of Adjustment, 138 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
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must reach an independent conclusion. 67 Elsewhere, a trial de novo
has been equated with the substantial evidence rule so that a review-
ing court may only determine questions of law; viz., whether an admin-
istrative ruling is free from any illegality, and is reasonably supported
by substantial evidence.68
Another decision recognized two separate interpretations of trial
de novo. It may mean a trial of appeals as if the case originated in
the reviewing court; or it may mean that the parties are entitled to a
trial de novo on the record made below-i.e., the court's review is
limited either to questions of law, or to questions of law and fact,
based on the record presented to it upon appeal. 9 Another restrictive
interpretation of trial de novo is one which limits an appeal court to
the determination of whether the administrative findings were against
the weight of evidence. 0
In Connecticut, a court was formerly confined to facts actually or
assumed to have been proven before an administrative agency when
determining whether it acted arbitrarily, illegally, or in excess of its
discretion. The only change wrought by a statutory authorization of
de novo review was one which permitted the reviewing court to
make a similar determination by conducting an independent inquiry.7 1
V. SHOULD KENTuCKY RFTAiN ITS DE Novo REVImw?
It is submitted that the de novo review is a misguided effort to
thwart the sound discretion of planners. The requirement of such
review also prompts numerous questions. Doesn't it seem incongru-
ous that decisions by planning administrators in cities of the first class
are subject to a full scale de novo review, when decisions by planners
in lower class cities are not subject to similar review? Ordinarily, a
large city can better afford a more competent planning staff than can
a small city, yet a court may overturn administrative decisions in the
former more readily than it may in the latter. Aren't local planners
more familiar with the long-range needs of the local area than are the
courts? In view of the de novo provisions, why shouldn't we allow per-
67 Peterson v. Vasak, 162 Neb. 498, 76 N.W.2d 420, 427 (1956); Cf. Certain-
Teed Products Corp. v. Paris Township, 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d 705, 718
(1958).68 Fire Dep't v. City of Fort Worth, 147 Tex. 505, 217 S.W.2d 664, 666
(1949); Simpson v. City of Houston, 260 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
6Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 98 Utah 431, 100 P.2d
552, 554-55 (1940).
70 Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 220 Ark.
631, 249 S.W.2d 8, 9 (1952).
71 De Mond v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 129 Conn. 642, 30 A.2d 547 (1943).
For further discussion and consideration of de novo review of administrative
findings, see Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1217 (1952).
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sons to institute a cause of action in the circuit court in the first in-
stance, rather than have them take a circuitous route through admin-
istrative agencies? Even the Kentucky court has questioned the wis-
dom of de novo review since local administrators have special tech-
nical and overall knowledge of zoning plans and their application. 72
Kentucky maintains the tenuous distinction that matters such as a
zoning commission's denial of a request to reclassify certain land must
bear a substantial relation to the local police power, as borne out by
a trial de novo,73 whereas an ordinance will be presumed valid and up-
held without a trial de novo when reasonable minds may differ as to
whether it has a substantial relation to a valid exercise of the police
power.74 This latter view reflects the attitude that courts should not
undo the careful thought that has gone into a zoning arrangement pro-
jected by planning authorities and implemented by action of the
governing body in passing necessary zoning ordinances.7 5 Since this
seems to be the desirable approach for reviewing planners' decisions,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals should find a method to circumvent
the apparently broad statutory requirement of de novo review.
Section 27 of the Kentucky Constitution provides for the separation
of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
the state government. By virtue of sections 135 and 109, the judicial
powers of the state are vested solely in the constitutional courts.
It is often difficult to label an administrative agency either "legisla-
tive" or "judicial", since it may partake of the nature of both and act
in a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative manner. When an administra-
tive body exercises a "legislative discretion", it would appear to be in-
appropriate for a judicial court to hold a trial de novo and substitute
its own opinion on the matter. This theory is exemplified by Califor-
nia Co. v. State Oil & Gas Board.70 When an administrative agency
makes permissible exceptions to a general legislative rule (analogous
to the granting of variances as a permissible exception to ordinances),
it acts at least in a quasi-legislative capacity. A reviewing court may
still determine whether the permissible exception was supported by
substantial evidence, or whether it was arbitrary, ultra vires, or uncon-
stitutional; in this respect, the court is acting judicially. However, in
view of the "separation of powers" doctrine, the reviewing court may
not provide a trial de novo and substitute its own opinion on matters
of legislative discretion.
-2 Hamilton Co. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
287 SW.2d 434, 436 (Ky. 1956).
73 Id. at 436-37.
74 City of Louisville v. Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., 286 S.W.2d 546 (Ky. 1956).
75 See Tzeses v. Bd. of Trustees, 22 N.J. Super. 45, 91 A.2d 588, 596 (1952).
70 200 Miss. 824, 27 So.2d 542 (1946).
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When a board or commission grants discretionary relief in the
nature of variances or exceptions to a zoning ordinance, or when it
grants relief sought on special applications, the board or commission
acts in a quasi-legislative manner. Instead of dealing with judicial
facts, it is extensively engaged in matters of legislative policy. Not-
withstanding provisions for a trial de novo, a reviewing court should
do no more than examine questions of law.
Certain objections to this approach may be anticipated. The Ken-
tucky court has stated that the board of adjustment is a quasi-judicial
body with limited powers, and that proceedings before it are informal
and of a similar quasi-judicial natured7 The fact that a board's
hearings are quasi-judicial, however, is immaterial. As for the board
itself, while it may be quasi-judicial in one sense, it may be quasi-
legislative in still another. The enactment, formulation, and promulga-
tion of planning and zoning orders, regulations, ordinances, or classi-
fications tend to be legislative rather than judicial in character.y
While the planners' hearings may be quasi-judical, their basic function
is quasi-legislative. Although this argument may appear anomalous,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized the possible existence
of quasi-judicial proceedings that look toward legislative action.79
Another objection to the "separation of powers" theory may arise on
the alleged ground that the power to zone property within a city can-
not be delegated to a board of adjustment.8 0 Thus, two cases have
held that where the grant of a variance would virtually change pro-
perty from one classification to another when no hardship exists, it
would effectively amend or repeal the zoning oidinance and be an
invalid usurpation of power.81 From this it might be inferred that a
board could never possess legislative powers, and that a court would
not be exercising a legislative function in substituting its judgment for
the board's determination. However, the cases upon which this con-
clusion rests involved an attempt to evade the express provisions of
a statute. Read in context, it was apparent that the Kentucky court
77 1Hamilton Co. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
287 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Ky. 1955); Goodrich v. Selligman, 298 Ky. 863, 866-67,
183 S.W.2d 6295, 627 (1944); 1 Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice § 127 (1953).78 Kutcher v. Town Planning Comm'n, 138 Conn. 705, 88 A.2d 538, 540
(1952); State ex rel. Christopher v. Matthews, 362 Mo. 242, 240 S.W.2d 934,
938 (1951); Colt v. Bernard, 279 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); Cleve-
land Trust Co. v. Village of Brooklyn, 92 Ohio App. 351, 110 N.E.2d 440, 444-
45 1952); Horack & Nolan, Land Use Controls 36 (1955). Cf. Fowler v. Obier,
224 Ky. 742, 760, 7 S.W.2d 219, 226-27 (1928); 1 Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise § 2.08, at 108, & § 2.09 (1958).
79 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 479-81 (1936).80 Bray v. Beyer, 292 Ky. 162, 166, 166 S.W.2d 290, 292 (1942).
81 Arrow Transp. Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 299 S.W.2d 95 (Ky.
1956); Bray v. Beyer, 292 Ky. 162, 166 S.W.2d 290 (1942).
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wanted to prevent the grant of a "use" variance although the statutes
granted unqualified authority for the board to permit any variance it
desired. The decision itself is questionable. As the late Judge Sims
indicated in a dissenting opinion, to disturb the board's decision when
it acts within its statutory power to grant variances is to emasculate
the statute and virtually abolish the board. 2 Generally, the granting
of variances is universally upheld as a proper administrative function,
and it is submitted that neither of the foregoing Kentucky cases may
be considered as strong precedent against the delegation of legislative
powers. Abuse in the granting of variances could be enjoined by with-
drawing the board's authority to grant variances,83or by prescribing a
standard of "reasonableness" which permeates all phases of the law.
Even if the Kentucky court is unwilling to follow the "separation
of powers" doctrine, it may still restrict the scope of review under the
de novo provisions. Reference is made to Part IV of this note for
varied and restrictive interpretations of "trial de novo."
VI. JumcaLA EvI.w IN CATEGomrEs 2 AND 3
CASE CONSnMAMRrONS
A. Second Class Cities
There is a relative dearth of cases relating to judicial review as ap-
plied to cases within Category 2. However, under review provisions
similar to those which are now in effect, it has been held that where an
administrative decision is reviewed upon an original record certified to
the court, the case must be heard upon the original record to de-
termine whether there was probative evidence to support the decision.
The court has no right to hear additional evidence on the merits.84
Similarly, in considering the pertinent part of a former statute85 which
was substantially incorporated in KRS section 100.490, the Kentucky
court held that a judicial determination upon review of a decision by
the board of adjustment is limited to a consideration of the record as
certified to the court by the board. 6
Perhaps Hatch v. Fiscal Court8 7 is Kentucky's leading case in this
category. It recognized that there was no statutory provision specific-
ally authorizing review of the findings of a zoning commission of a sec-
ond class city; however, the court stated that there is a limited inherent
8 2 Arrow Transp. Co. v. Planning & Zoning Comnm'n, 299 S.W.2d 95, 97-98
(Ky. 1956).
83 See Horack & Nolan, Land Use Controls 176 & n.47 (1955).
84 Barnes v. Turner, 280 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Ky. 1955).
85 Carroll's Ky. Stat. Ann. (Baldwin's 1936 Rev.) § 3235f-9a.86 Bosworth v. City of Lexington, 277 Ky. 90, 104-05, 125 S.W.2d 995, 1002
(1939).
87 242 S.W.2d 1018 (Ky. 1951).
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power to prevent an administrative body from proceeding illegally,
arbitrarily, or capriciously.A8
In another area, it has been held that a board's action in denying
an application to improve certain premises should be upheld so long
as the board did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or dictatorial
manner.8 9 This holding is predicated on the notion that, although no
harm would result from the particular contemplated change, it may be
that under a long-range view an exception here would lead to similar
changes elsewhere and thereby defeat some of the objectives of zon-
ing.
B. Third Through Sixth Class Cities
Perhaps it is an overstatement to say that a trial de novo is afforded
only for review of decisions falling within Category 1. Ostensibly, the
breadth of review afforded on appeal from planning and zoning dec-
isions rests on a descending scale from Category 1 through Category
3; i.e., from a trial de novo, to a limited right of appeal, to a discre-
tionary review by writ of certiorari. Once the writ is granted, how-
ever, the scope of review may exceed all apparent bounds. In con-
struing a Florida statute9" substantially the same as KRS section 100.-
590, it has been held that the procedure partakes of the nature of an
original trial de novo whereby the judge may take evidence and make
an independent original determination of the correctness of an appeal
board's determination.9 1
Kentucky cases which involve or discuss judicial review within
Category 3 are, like those in Category 2, somewhat scarce. The City
of Richlawn case 92 involved a direct attack on an ordinance. Suit was
brought for an injunction, and an appeal was taken from a judgment
granting the relief sought. It was not a case of judicial review by
certiorari provided by KRS section 100.590. Another case which in-
volved an appeal under a former statute9 3 providing for review by a
writ of certiorari turned upon the interpretation of a particular phase.9 4
The case of Byrn v. Beechwood Village,95 which upheld an amend-
ment to a municipal ordinance when it was apparently reasonable, in-
volved an appeal from a suit for injunction. Again, there was no re-
88 Cf. Long v. Zoning Comm'n, 133 Conn. 247, 50 A.2d 172, 174 (1946),
where it was stated that there can be no appeal from decisions of a zoning com-
mission unless a statute provides for such appeal.
89 Moore v. City of Lexington, 309 Ky. 671, 218 S.W.2d 7 (1948).
90 Fla. Stat. §§ 176.16-.19 (1955).
91 Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1957).
92 City of Richlawn v. McMalin, 313 Ky. 265, 230 S.W.2d 902 (1950).
93 Carroll's Ky. Stat. Ann. (Baldwin's 1936 Rev.) § 8037h-122.
94 Goodrich v. Selligman, 298 Ky. 863, 183 S.W.2d 625 (1944).
95 253 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1952).
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view by certiorari proceedings. Since there was no provision for ap-
peal from the legislative determination (i.e., the ordinance), the ag-
grieved party had to resort to the equitable jurisdiction of courts for
relief.
Hence, there appears to be no decisive Kentucky case as to the
nature and scope of review afforded by statutory provisions within
Category 8. Perhaps it will be held that findings of fact are not open to
revision, and that only errors of law may be reviewed.96
VII. BURDEN OF PROOF ON APPEAL
In upholding the denial of a variance by a zoning board, the Con-
necticut court has recognized that the board must necessarily be vested
with wide discretion, and has declared that the burden of proof is on
the one attacking the board's determination to show that the agency
acted improperly. 97
In Kentucky, the statutory provisions for judicial review in Cate-
gory 1 require the circuit court to issue a "show cause" order. This has
been construed to mean that the one against whom the order was
directed has the burden of proof to sustain the particular determina-
tion; i.e., the burden of proof is upon the agency making the determi-
nation, rather than on the one attacking it.9
In considering ordinances, the law presumes an ordinance is valid,
and the one attacking it must show its invalidity. If reasonable minds
may differ as to whether the ordinance is a valid exercise of power,
it must be upheld.99 A similar result obtains in cases involving judicial
review decisions of a zoning commission in Category 2. The commis-
sion's action is presumed to be reasonable, and in accordance with
law; it is incumbent upon the party attacking such decision to make a
clear showing of unreasonableness. 100
VII. CONCLUSION
The scope of judicial review, by which Kentucky planning and
and zoning decisions are examined, is dependent upon several variable
factors. The necessity for this variation is difficult to comprehend.
90 Brackett v. Bd. of Appeal of Bldg. Dep't, 311 Mass. 52, 89 N.E.2d 956,
957 (1942); Bradley v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Mass. 160, 150 N.E. 892,
893-94 (1926).97 Talmadge v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 141 Conn. 639, 109 A.2d 253, 254(1954).
98 Boyd v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 313 Ky.
196, 230 S.W.2d 444 (1949).
99 City of Louisville v. Puritan Apartment Hotel Co., 264 S.W.2d 888, 890(Ky. 1954).
100 Hatch v. Fiscal Court, 242 S.W.2d 1018, 1021 (Ky. 1951).
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In order to avoid confusion and promote uniformity in this field,
the following adjustments to existing law are deemed advisable:
1. The statutory requirement for de novo review should be legisla-
tively repealed or judicially emasculated.
2. The scope of judicial review of planning and zoning decisions
should be the same regardless of city classification; i.e., the extent of
judicial review should be the same in Categories 1, 2, and 3.
3. Both administrative and legislative determinations should be
tested by the same standard. Although members of a legislative body
are normally elected and held accountable at the polls, both boards
and commissions operate under legislative sanction. Their powers
may be expanded or contracted by an appropriate ordinance or sta-
tute. The fact that administrators are not subject to political pressures
may enable them to take a more objective approach to their work.
4. An administrative or legislative determination of fact should be
upheld if it is supported by "substantial evidence." If the justification
of a particular determination is "fairly debatable," the determination
should be upheld. 101 In other words, rather than test the validity of
a decision by the "preponderance of evidence," determine whether a
reasonable board acting reasonably could have reached the particular
decision.
5. Judicial review should be limited to a determination of whether
the planners acted illegally, arbitrarily, or unreasonably.
6. Judicial review should be restricted to an examination of the
"whole record." If no record was made, permit the reviewing court
to take additional evidence only to the extent necessary for it to
execute its prescribed function.
7. A rebuttable presumption should be established that planning
and zoning decisions are valid. One who attacks such a decision
would then have to sustain the burden of proving its invalidity.10 2
The foregoing recommendations obviously favor the role played by
planners-both legislative and administrative. But if we are going to
101 This is analogous to a trial judge's role in disposing of a motion for a
judgment non obstante veredicto. Although the judge may personally disagree
with the ultimate factual conclusion evinced by a jury verdict, he cannot set it
aside if supported by some credible evidence. Childs, "Local Government Law-
Zoning," 5 Wayne L. Rev. 86, 44 (1958).
102 Zoning without reasonable stability is, perhaps, worse than no zoning at
all. If the zoning laws of any community are to be effective; if a community
is to have a zoning law on which its citizens can rely; if the community is to have
a zoning law under which residential districts can be established with sufficient
stability to justify investments in homes with confidence that the residential dis-
tricts will be protected by the zoning law-the zoning law must be protected by
a legal presumption of validity so that the courts may not upset the law except in
cases where the action of the zoning body is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.
In reasonably debatable situations, the zoning law must be upheld.
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hire specialists to do planning and zoning work, why must the courts,
which do not claim special competence in the matter, be called upon to
make decisions which may ultimately do violence to a long-range
planning objective? There is no requirement for a community to estab-
lish a program or system of planning and zoning. Once such a system
is adopted, however, the planners should be given wide discretion to
accomplish the purpose for which they were engaged.
Nelson E. Shafer
